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Custody Rights Of
Unwed Fathers
California Civil Code Sections 220 and 224 give the mother of an
illegitimate child total right to custody and control over that child
and no right to custody and control to the father of such child.
Furthermore, if there is some reason for the mother to relinquish
her custody and control of the illegitimate child, the father is still
given no preference over third parties as to custody and control.
In this comment the author examines the development of the com-
mon law behind the California statutes which gave the mother pref-
erence as to custody, discusses the policies behind the specific
California rules concerning the custody of illegitimate children,
suggests that in our modern society the present rules serve no valid
policy, compares the rules concerning illegitimate children with
those concerning legitimate children and finds no rational reason
for difference in policy as to custody between the two types of
children, examines the constitutionality of the California rules in
light of the due process and equal protection clauses as well as
the proposed equal rights amendment, and concludes that a law
which gives no right to custody and control of the illegitimate child
to the natural father of that child should not survive either policy
considerations or constitutional attack.
California custody statutes presently give the mother of illegitimate
children the right to full custody and control over the children.' Cus-
tody statutes for legitimate children, on the other hand, favor parents
over nonparents but do not favor one parent over the other. This
comment examines the common law parental preference rule and finds
a rational basis for extending this rule to include unwed fathers. Also
discussed is the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Stan-
ley v. Illinois,' which suggests that an unwed father's right to due proc-
ess and equal protection of the law may be violated when he is denied
custody without a hearing as to his parental unfitness. Moreover, if
the equal rights amendment recently ratified by the California Leg-
islature4 becomes law, statutes governing custody of illegitimate children
may be invalid as discriminating against male parents.
1. CAL. CIV. CODE §§200, 224.
2. CAL. CIv. CODE §§224, 4600.
3. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
4. S.J. Res. 20, CAL. STATs. 1972, C. 148.
1973 / Custody Rights of Unwed Fathers
UNWED FATHER'S CUSTODY RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW
At early English common law, an illegitimate child was held to be
fitlius nullius, the child of nobody, or filius populi, the child of the peo-
ple.'; Under this doctrine "the custody of such a child was in the
hands of the parish."6 Custodial rights were considered property rights
which had commercial value and were subject to transfer and sale.7
Presumably, custody rights were not recognized in unmarried parents
because no legal relationship existed between such parents and their
children.
As equity began to exercise jurisdiction in custody disputes, the doc-
trine of filius populi was modified to recognize a primary right to cus-
tody of illegitimate children in the mother.8 Various reasons have
been proposed for considering the unwed mother a more natural
guardian than the father. These include: (1) the mother is more
easily identified than the father; (2) she is biologically better suited to
care for and nurture the child; and (3) the natural bonds of love and
affection for the child are stronger in the mother than in any other per-
son.9 Later the custody rules were further modified to recognize that the
right of a competent father to custody of his illegitimate child is su-
perior to the right of anyone other than the mother "and on the death
of the mother he prima facie becomes entitled as against the world to
the care and custody of the child." 10  The reasoning behind the rule
that the mother of illegitimate children is necessarily a better custodian
than the father may be invalid, but it underlies both the common law
rule and California custody statutes.1
UNWED FATHER'S CUSTODY RIGHTS UNDER CALIFORNIA STATUTES
A. Mother's Right to Full Control over Child
California Civil Code Section 200 provides that the mother of an il-
legitimate unmarried minor is entitled to its custody, services and earn-
ings. If the mother is alive and a fit parent, and the child has not
been legitimated, her right to custody is absolute. 12 Moreover, the na-
tural father does not acquire custody rights merely by acknowledging
5. 8 CAL. JuR. 2d Bastards §2 (Rev. 1968).
6. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27, 33 (1967).
7. Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the Judicial Appli-
cation of "The Best Interests of the Child" Doctrine, 65 MIcH. L. Rnv. 145, 151
(1966).
8. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27, 34 (1967).
9. 10 AM. JUR. 2d Bastards §60 (1963).
10. id. §62.
11. Id. §60; CAL.. Cirv. CODE §200.
12. Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 93, 265 P.2d 888, 890 (1954).
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paternity.' 3
Even when the mother does not desire custody, the father has no
dominant parental right and only the mother's consent is necessary for
adoption of the illegitimate child.14  If the unwed mother wishes to
put the child up for adoption, a father who wishes to give the child
his parental care is confronted with the judicial argument that if the
legislature had intended the father's consent to be necessary for adop-
tion, it would have said so in simple language.' 5
It has also been held that the unwed mother acts for herself and
as the father's agent in all matters affecting the child, and that her
agency is implied in law and extends to renunciation of the father's
parental rights.16 While this view seems to recognize by implication
the existence of a parental right of the father, it denies him any oppor-
tunity to exercise it. Thus, in Guardianship of Truschke,'7 a natural
father who acknowledged paternity of his illegitimate child, spent $310
for a crib and baby clothes, and desired to receive the child into his
home, was denied custody of his child because the mother put it in a
pre-adoptive foster home before the father could legitimate it. The
court of appeal in Truschke said that Civil Code Section 200 implied
the mother's right to full control over the child.18  Thus neither the
father's public declaration of his paternity nor his desire to legitimate
his child was sufficient to prevent the mother from allowing the child
to be placed for adoption.
B. Legitimation by the Father
The reluctance of California courts to recognize custody rights of
unwed fathers may be explained by the existence of the California le-
gitimation statute, Civil Code Section 230. Under this statute, the fa-
ther of an illegitimate child by publicly acknowledging it as his own,
receiving it into his family, and treating it as a legitimate child "adopts"
and legitimates it.19 If the father complies with the requirements of
Section 230, the child's status becomes that of a legitimate child of
both natural parents; thus the mother's rights under Section 200 are
13. Adoption of Irby, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 -Cal. Rptr. 879 (1964). For
effect of legitimation of the child by its father, see text accompanying notes 19-20
infra.
14. Guardianship of Truschke, 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 79-80, 46 Cal. Rptr. 601,
604 (1965); CAL. Civ. CODE §224.
15. Adoption of Irby, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 241, 37 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881-82(1964); In re Campbell, 9 Cal. App. 2d 622, 623-24, 51 P.2d 138, 139 (1935).
16. Adoption of Laws, 201 Cal. App. 2d 494, 500, 20 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68 (1962).
17. 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 46 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1965).
18. Id. at 79-80, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
19. CAL. Civ. CODE §230.
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modified and neither parent has a superior right to custody.20
Since the public interest favors the legitimation of children, it is ar-
gued that custody rights are justly denied to unwed fathers who fail to
confer the status of legitimacy on their children. Yet in many cases,
despite the father's public acknowledgment of paternity and desire to
legitimate the child, he cannot do so. For example, if the father is
married to a woman who is not the child's mother, he must obtain his
wife's consent to receive the child into their home; if she refuses con-
sent, he cannot comply with Section 230. Similarly, if the child's na-
tural mother wants custody and refuses to marry or live with the father,
he would have no chance to legitimate the child since he would have to
take the child away from its mother in order to receive it into his
family. Even in a situation in which the mother and father had been
living together as a family, if the mother places the child up for adop-
tion immediately after its birth, the father would have no opportunity
to receive the child into his home as is required under Section 230.
C. Father's Obligation to Support Child
Regardless of whether or not the father seeks custody of his illegiti-
mate child, he, as well as the mother, is obligated to support and edu-
cate the child. The child's mother or guardian may sue to enforce
such an obligation" and the father may be criminally liable if he will-
fully fails to provide his illegitimate child with necessary food, shelter
or medical attention. This is true even when the mother is legally en-
titled to custody and regardless of whether or not such necessities are
already being furnished by other persons.2 2 Therefore, it seems clear
that the legislature has adopted a policy in which the father's duty to
support his illegitimate child is independent of his right (or lack
thereof) to custody of the child.
In summary, the California Legislature has chosen a policy toward
the father of an illegitimate child which gives him no right to custody
of his child. This policy, based in part on a belief that it will
encourage the legitimation of illegitimate children, is independent of
the father's duty to support his illegitimate child. It has been held,
however, that this policy toward the father is applicable only while the
mother is alive, and no California statute covers the question of the
existence or non-existence of a father's right to custody after the death
of the mother.
20. Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336, 340, 205 P.2d 48, 51 (1949); In re
Navarro, 77 Cal. App. 2d 500, 505, 175 P.2d 896, 899 (1946).
21. CAL. Cv. CODE §196a.
22. CAL. PEN. CODE §270.
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FATHER'S CUSTODY RIGHTS AFTER MOTHER'S DEATH
In Guardianship of Smith,2 3 a majority of the California Supreme
Court, relying on case law of other jurisdictions, concluded that upon
the death of the mother, the natural father is entitled to custody of an
illegitimate child if the father is a fit person.2 4 In Smith, the sister of
two minor children petitioned to be appointed their guardian after the
mother had died. The natural father filed objections to the sister's
appointment and asked that he be appointed the children's guardian.
The trial court found that both the sister and the father were fit and
proper persons to be given custody, but that it was in the best interests
of the children that the sister be appointed guardian. The supreme
court reversed for retrial on the issues of fact, stating that while the
best interests of an illegitimate child are the important factor, the
child's parents have a superior claim to any third parties if they are
fit and proper.2 5 The court cited numerous foreign cases holding
that an unwed father is entitled to custody of the child as against all
but the mother, that he is considered its "natural" guardian though he
is not legally related to it, and that after the mother's death the father
has a prima facie superior right to custody. 28
One of the central issues dividing the Smith court was the ques-
tion of whether the father, even after the mother's death, must legiti-
mate the child in order to earn his right to custody. The majority did
not make legitimation a prerequisite of obtaining custody but did note
that legitimation is more likely to occur if the father is awarded cus-
tody, since without the right to custody he would not be likely to re-
ceive the children into his home and treat them as legitimate off-
spring.27 Justice Traynor, in his concurring opinion, assumed the
children would be legitimated if custody were given to the father and
that otherwise "they [would] remain to all intents and purposes or-
phans."28 Justice Traynor was also concerned that the children would
not receive proper care and support from their father if they remained
outside his home and "essentially strangers to him. 29  Certainly it
does not seem likely that the sister, though she might provide adequate
support, would go through the necessary procedures to formally adopt
the children. It is much easier for the desired legitimate status to be
achieved by the father's informal actions of treating the children as
his own.
23. 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954).
24. Id. at 93, 265 P.2d at 890.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 94, 265 P.2d at 890.
28. Id. at 97, 265 P.2d at 892.
29. Id.
926
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While the majority in Smith was willing to take the chance that
the father would legitimate the children if given custody, Justice Tray-
nor insisted that the father should be required to explain why he had
not already legitimated the children and to establish on retrial that the
children would be legitimated "as a minimum prerequisite to establish-
ing his fitness for appointment as guardian. '30  Seeming to regard
parental custody in the unwed father as more of a privilege than a
right, Justice Traynor asserted that a father who is able to legitimate
his child but fails to do so thereby demonstrates his unfitness as a
guardian. 1 Further, "[s]uch a father must not be allowed to bargain
with the court by offering to exercise his power to legitimate in ex-
change for custody. '32  Yet Justice Traynor seemed to be allowing
the court to bargain with the father by withholding the right of custody
until receiving the father's promise to legitimate.
If the father in Smith had willfully refused to legitimate his chil-
dren, probably not even the majority of the court would have been
willing to appoint him as guardian; it might have found that such an
attitude proved the father an unfit parent, or simply that custody in a
person who was willing to inflict illegitimate status permanently on his
children would be detrimental to the children's best interests.
A different situation would arise if the father, though willing to le-
gitimate, could not do so because of circumstances beyond his control
-for example, lack of his present wife's consent. Here the court
might have found that the presumption that parental custody serves
the children's best interests was overcome by the facts and that it
would be detrimental to the children to have their legal guardianship
in their father while their physical custody was elsewhere. However,
it seems more likely that the Smith majority would have appointed the
father legal guardian in such a situation in order to encourage the fa-
ther's parental concern which could only benefit the child.
EXTENSION OF Ip RULE IN SMITH
Can the rule of Smith, that the unwed father has a prima facie su-
perior right to custody after the mother's death, be extended to situa-
tions in which the mother is alive but cannot be granted custody?
Truschke33 held that the father had no dominant parental right even
when the mother did not want custody; but in that case the mother
had already placed the child for adoption, thereby putting the child be-
30. Id. at 98, 265 P.2d at 893.
31. Id. at 98, 265 P.2d at 892.
32. Id. at 98, 265 P.2d at 892-93.
33. Guardianship of Truschke, 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 46 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1965).
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yond the father's control because of Civil Code Section 224.84 If the
mother simply had not wanted custody and had done nothing to affect
the child's legal status, or if the mother was found to be an unfit parent
and thus denied custody, would the father then have a dominant right
to custody as against a stranger? If the parents of an illegitimate
child do indeed have a superior claim to custody as against the world if
they are fit and proper, as the Smith majority asserted,8 then the fa-
ther, if a fit parent, arguably should be given custody in both of these
hypothetical situations.
Though California and other jurisdictions infer that a father's right
to custody of an illegitimate child after the mother's death is a natural
right,3 6 it is universally assumed that the mother has a stronger right
than the father. The argument which holds that a father's natural
rights lie dormant while the mother is alive and then suddenly spring
to life when the mother dies appears more expedient than logical.
Furthermore, the reasoning underlying this argument is based on the
assumption that the unwed mother is always, or generally, a better
custodian of her minor children than is their father. This assumption
may be invalid, especially in the light of contrary assumptions made
as to legitimate parents.
CUSTODY RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE PARENTS:
THE PARENTAL PREFERENCE RULE
A. History of the Rule
Prior to enactment of California Civil Code Section 4600 in 1969,
there were two important California statutes dealing with custody of
legitimate children: Civil Code Section 138 and Code of Civil Pro-
cedure Section 1751.
Civil Code Section 138 provided that in divorce and separate main-
tenance actions the court could "make such order for the custody of
such minor children as may seem necessary or proper" and was to be
guided "by what appears to be for the best interests of the child. '87
The section made no mention of parents having preferred status over
strangers as custodians, and in fact it read as a strict best interests of
the child rule. Under such a rule, a court was free to award custody
to a stranger merely upon finding that his care would be better for the
child's welfare than would the care of either parent. However, the
34. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
35. Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 93, 265 P.2d 888, 890 (1954).
36. Id.; Armstrong v. Price, 292 S.W. 447, 448 (Mo. App. 1927); Ex parte
Wallace, 26 N.M. 181, 190 P. 1020, 1022 (1920); Aycock v. Hampton, 84 Miss. 204,
36 So. 245 (1904).
37. As amended, CAL. STATS. 1951, c. 1700, §6, at 3911, repealed, CAL. STATS.
1969, c. 1608, §3, at 3313.
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courts interpreted the statute in light of the strong common law doc-
trine of parental preference. 38 Under this doctrine, parents are given
a dominant right to custody of their children, not only because parents
are presumed fit guardians, but because a presumption exists that the
best interest of a child is served by having it placed with its fit parent. 39
Thus in In re Campbell, a guardianship proceeding before the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in 1900, the court observed that "[u]nder the
general law, and independently of the provisions of the codes, the
father has a natural right to the care and custody of his child." 0  At
the time of this decision, the court was guided by Code of Civil Pro-
cedure Section 1751,41 which provided that the father or mother of a
minor child was entitled to be appointed guardian if found by the
court to be competent to discharge the duties of guardianship. Camp-
bell declared that under this provision, and under the general law, the
parent was assumed to be competent, and thus the court could not ap-
point another as guardian unless the parents are found incompetent.42
Later cases continued to hold that before a fit parent could be de-
prived of custody there had to be an affirmative finding that the parent
is unfit43 even though none of the code sections expressly required
such a finding. Though Campbell considered parental custody rights
to be "at least so far as the services of the child are concerned . . .
strictly a property right,"44 modern cases emphasize a personal status
theory of custody rather than a property theory. That is, "natural
parents, because of their relationship to the child, [are] presumed to be
the custodians best fitted to serve the child's needs. 45
B. Modern Statutes Governing Legitimate Child Custody
Modernly, in both guardianship and custody proceedings for legiti-
mate children, California statutes give preference to parents over non-
parents, but neither parent is favored over the other.46
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1751 was repealed in 1931 with
the enactment of the Probate Code.41 Sections 1406 and 1407 of the
Probate Code provide that, in appointing a general guardian of a
minor, the court is to be guided by the best interests of the child but
38. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 259 Cal. App. 2d 418, 66 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1968).
39. Id. at 422, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
40. In re Campbell, 130 Cal. 380, 382, 62 P. 613, 614 (1900).
41. Repealed, CAL. STATS. 1931, c. 281, §1700, at 687.
42. In re Campbell, 130 Cal. 380, 383, 62 P. 613, 614 (1900).
43. Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal. 2d 447, 453, 260 P.2d 44, 48 (1953); Roche v.
Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 143-44, 152 P.2d 999, 1000 (1944); Moffitt v. Moffitt, 242
Cal. App. 2d 580, 582, 51 Cal. Rptr. 683, 685 (1966).
44. In re Campbell, 130 Cal. 380, 382, 62 P. 613, 614 (1900).
45. Katz, supra note 7, at 151.
46. CAL. CIv. CODE §4600; CAL. PROB. CODE §§1407, 1408.
47. CAL. STATS. 1931, c. 281, §§1406, 1700, at 670, 687.
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that preference is to be given to a parent among persons equally en-
titled in other respects to the guardianship.
California Civil Code Section 4600 (which replaced Section 138 in
1969)18 requires the award of custody of a minor child to a parent un-
less the court finds that custody in either parent would be detrimental
to the child, and that the award to a nonparent is required to serve the
child's best interests. Section 4600 at one time gave preference to the
mother if the child was of tender years, but this provision was deleted
by the legislature in 1972,49 apparently recognizing that each family
situation should be examined independently of any assumptions about
which parent is generally considered more suited to caring for very
young children.
Compared to former statutes as interpreted, 0 the language of Civil
Code Section 4600 could be construed as a weakening of the parental
preference rule. The section does not require a finding of parental
unfitness before custody can be awarded to a nonparent, but only that
parental custody would be detrimental to the child and that award to
a nonparent would be required to serve the child's best interests. Yet
the wording of the statute may simply be the result of legislative reluc-
tance to impose the stigma of unfitness on a parent. Also, the criteria
for establishing unfitness and those for establishing detriment to the
child would seem to be substantially the same.
Thus it appears that the California custody statutes for legitimate
children codify the parental preference rule, although this is unclear
from a literal reading of the statutes.
Two recent cases, In re Marriage of Russo5 ' and Bookstein v. Book-
stein,5 2 suggest that as between married parents the courts will continue
to apply the best interests of the child standard under Civil Code Sec-
tion 4600 in determining which parent should have custody. Since
these cases did not involve custody disputes between parents and non-
parents, they do not indicate whether or not the parental preference
rule will be applied when courts interpret Section 4600 in such dis-
putes. Even if they are not bound to do so by the statute's language,
it seems likely that the courts will read a strong parental preference
rule into Section 4600 just as they did in interpreting former Section
138.
48. CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1608, §8, at 3330.
49. A.B. 662, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1007.
50. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
51. 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 98 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1971).
52. 7 Cal. App. 3d 219, 86 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1970).
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C. Should Parental Rights be Subordinated to Best Interests of the
Child?
Some courts dislike the parental preference rule because it seems to
place parental rights above the welfare of children. In Roche v.
Roche 5 3 a divorce court awarded joint control of a child to both par-
ents but gave physical care and control to the paternal grandparents.
Though the child had been living with her grandparents for several
years, the California Supreme Court reversed the order and gave cus-
tody to the mother because she had not been proven unfit.5" Justice
Schauer objected in his dissent, "Surely the child must be regarded as
having some rights," and then asserted that "those rights should be
weighed and balanced as against or in favor of those who are asserting
their own rights to its custody."55
Correctly stated, however, the parental preference rule is not that
parents' claims are superior to the rights and welfare of children, but
only that the law presumes parental custody will serve the child's best
interests. 56
D. Dangers of a Strict Best Interests Rule
In the well publicized decision of Painter v. Bannister,57 a father,
after his wife's death, had given temporary custody of his son to the
maternal grandparents. A year and a half later the father remarried
and sought to regain custody of his son. There was no showing that
the father was unfit, though the court found that he had unconven-
tional religious beliefs and generally led a Bohemian type of life. Con-
versely, the grandparents were conventional, stable, middle-class folk.
The Iowa court reversed an order awarding custody to the father be-
cause the court believed it would not be in the boy's best interest to
remove him from the stable atmosphere of the grandparents' home.
Thus the court seemed to use the best interests rule to apply its own
values and prejudices to deny custody to a parent who was not found
to be unfit.5 8 Had the parental preference rule been applied, the fa-
ther probably would have been awarded custody.
In a California case, O'Brien v. O'Brien,5 9 a father appealed an
order awarding custody of his minor child to her maternal grandpar-
53. 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944).
54. Id. at 143-44, 152 P.2d at 1000.
55. Id. at 145, 152 P.2d at 1001.
56. In re White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637, 640, 129 P.2d 706, 708 (1942); Katz,
supra note 7, at 151.
57. 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
58. 258 Iowa at 1393, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
59. 259 Cal. App. 2d 418, 66 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1968).
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ents after the parents' divorce. The trial court had found that neither
parent was a fit and proper person to have custody. The evidence
showed that the father was reserved with limited ability to show affec-
tion and that because of his long working hours he was not able to
spend a great deal of time with his daughter. But the appellate court
observed that "[a]lthough fitness is a factual question, the burden on
the one claiming parental unfitness is a heavy one." 0  Finding that
the evidence did not prove the father to be an unsuitable or incompe-
tent parent, the court reversed the order and awarded custody to the
father.6 Under application of a strict best interests test, the lower
court's order in O'Brien probably could not have been disturbed on
appeal.62
The vague best interests of the child standard probably does less to
protect the child's true interests than the parental preference rule, which
protects not only parents' rights but the parent-child relationship from
interference by the state or other third parties. Who can understand
the child's true best interests better than his fit parent? "There
should be a narrower means of protecting children from harm than a
law which authorizes the dissolution of the parent-child relationship
even when the parent is not harming the child."6
SHOULD PARENTAL PREFERENCE BE APPLIED TO UNWED FATHERS?
If, under application of a strict best interests of the child rule, a fit
parent of a legitimate child may be denied custody because of the
court's general disapproval of the parent, then it would seem that the
dangers of such a rule would be even greater if it were applied in pro-
ceedings involving custody of illegitimate children. However, even
a strict best interests of the child rule would at least not burden unwed
fathers with the presumption that mothers of illegitimate children are
necessarily better parents than are fathers. Such a presumption does
seem to underlie Civil Code Section 200.
Evidence suggests that this presumption may not be valid and may
not serve the best interests of illegitimate children. According to re-
cent studies, the unwed father "is not so disinterested, uncaring, and
detached from the situation he has helped to create as is popularly
supposed." 64 The popular belief that his relationship with the mother
60. Id. at 422, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
61. Id. at 422-23, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28.
62. Hammer, Divorce Reform in California: The Governor's Commission on the
Family and Beyond, 9 SANTA CLARA LAw. 32, 58 (1968).
63. Id. at 59.
64. Perkins and Grayson, The Juvenile Unwed Father, in NATIONAL COuNCIL ON
ILLEGITImACY, EsFcnv SERvicEs FOR UNMARIED PARENTS AND THEI CHILDREN 59(1968).
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is usually "fleeting and casual" is apparently false. One experienced
social worker has stated that, "[oin the contrary, for the great ma-
jority, the children born out of wedlock represent involvements rang-
ing from months to years in duration, and from affection to love
"65
Although an unwed father may deny paternity or seek to avoid the
burden of supporting his illegitimate child, his attitude may be caused
by his lack of opportunity to visit with the child and develop paternal
affection. 6 A father's lack of contact with his child does not always
signify unconcern- often the mother is unwilling to continue her in-
volvement with the father, and some social agencies follow a policy of
keeping the father from seeing the child or communicating with the
mother.67  When an agency actively encourages unwed fathers to be-
come involved with their children, the fathers tend to show parental
concern for the welfare of the children.6 8
Since the parental preference rule is modernly based not on the legal
relationship but on the natural relationship between parent and child,69
should not unwed fathers be included in the class of persons known
as "parents" and thus be presumed fit custodians of their children?
If it is true that "every child has a right to know something about its
natural parents,' 70 then perhaps every father has a right to take part
in vital decisions about his child-for example, the decision of whether
the child is going to live with its natural parent or be adopted by
strangers.
ARE CALIFORNIA CUSTODY STATUTES SUBJECT
TO CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK?
A. Stanley v. Illinois
Because of a recent United States Supreme Court decision involving
an unwed father's parental rights,71 the question arises whether the
custody rights of unwed fathers are so fundamental as to be constitu-
tionally protected.
The petitioner in Stanley v. Illinois was an unwed father whose chil-
dren, upon their mother's death, were automatically declared state
65. Herzog, Some Notes about Unmarried Fathers, 45 CHILD WELFARE 195(1966).
66. R. REED, THE ILLEGITIMATE FAMILY i NEW YORK CITY 183 (1972).
67. Id. at 160.
68. Id. at 162; R. PANNOR, F. MAssARi & B. EvANs, THE UNMARRIE FATmR
44 (1971).
69. Katz, supra note 7, at 151.
70. Smith, Changing Attitudes and Unchanging Needs, in THE SCOT1ISH COUNCIL
FOR THE UNMARRIED MOTHER AND HER CHILD, THE SINGLE PARENT 15 (1971).
71. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 4
wards and placed with court-appointed guardians. Under Illinois stat-
utes, the State assumed custody of the children of married parents, di-
vorced parents, and unmarried mothers only after a hearing and proof
of neglect. 72 The children of unmarried fathers, however, were de-
clared dependent children without a hearing on the father's fitness and
without proof of neglect.73  Stanley claimed that the Illinois statutes
deprived him of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment.74  The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stan-
ley's equal protection claim, holding that the State could constitu-
tionally omit unwed fathers from its statutory definition of parents and
thus deprive him of a hearing. In reversing the Illinois court decision,
the Supreme Court held that both the due process and the equal pro-
tection rights of Stanley had been violated. 75
1. Due Process
To determine whether statutes which grant exclusive custody rights
to unwed mothers are "arbitrary" in their discrimination against a
class of parents who have not been proven unfit and whether such
statutes are reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose-protection
of the illegitimate child's best interests-due process of law must be
examined.
Due process has been described by the Supreme Court as those
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions .... -76 Substantive due proc-
ess requires that legislation depriving a person of life, liberty or prop-
erty must be reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose and
must not be "arbitrary or capricious. 7 7  Procedural due process re-
quires notice and an opportunity for a hearing by a fair and impartial
tribunal before a state may deprive a person of a significant right.78
In its recent abortion law decisions,7" the Supreme Court examined
criminal abortion statutes in the light of modem medical data indicat-
ing that abortion in early pregnancy is now actually safer than normal
72. Id. at 658.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 646.
75. Id. at 658.
76. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
77. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
78. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
79. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
For a detailed analysis of the effect of these abortion cases on California law, see
Comment, The Landmark Abortion Decisions: Justifiable Termination or Miscarriage
of Justice?-Proposals for Legislative Response, this volume at 821.
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childbirth.80 The Court found in Roe v. Wade that the Texas crimi-
nal abortion statute, which permitted abortion only to save the mo-
ther's life, invaded petitioner's constitutionally protected zone of pri-
vacy8 l and violated due process."' The opinion emphasized that only
personal rights that are "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"83 are within this right of privacy.
Certainly an unwed father's custody rights are personal, not merely
economic; arguably, his rights are as deserving of judicial protection
as those of any other parent. Perhaps the relationship between a fa-
ther and his illegitimate child should be considered fundamental, cre-
ating a zone of privacy which the state cannot enter without a compel-
ling interest.
In Stanley the Supreme Court found that "[t]he private interest here,
that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably war-
rants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protec-
tion. '8 4 The right to raise one's children had been deemed an essen-
tial, basic civil right, the Court noted, and due process protection of
the family unit had been extended to illegitimate relationships. 5
Thus Stanley's parental rights were not to be ignored because he failed
to marry the mother of his children. He had a right to be treated as a
parent, not as a stranger, and could not be presumed unfit while
legitimate parents were presumed fit.86
The fact that Stanley had lived intermittently for eighteen years
with Joan Stanley and their children may have been significant in the
Court's willingness to protect the parent-child relationship in this case.
If parental rights are based on the notion that there is a "private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter,"87 would Stanley's right
have been protected if he had lived apart from his family during those
eighteen years and not as part of the family unit? Could the rela-
tionship between father and child then have been considered "cogniza-
ble and substantiar'? 88
The Court apparently believed that the rights of all biological par-
ents are so strong that a state cannot assume unfitness without a hear-
ing. The Court admitted, "It may be, as the State insists, that most
unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents . . . . But
80. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 731-32 (1973).
81. Id. at 727.
82. Id. at 732.
83. Id. at 726.
84. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 658.
87. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
88. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
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all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly suited
to have custody of their children." 89
On the other hand, it might be argued that Stanley, if construed nar-
rowly, requires a hearing only when the state is affirmatively acting to
remove a child that is already in the custody of its parent. The pro-
cedural due process grounds of Stanley were quite limited: the state
cannot presume that unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful
parents when all other parents are presumed fit, but must grant a hear-
ing on the father's fitness before his children can be taken from him. 0°
It is not at all clear that due process requires a hearing on the fitness of
a father who is challenging the automatic granting of custody to the
mother under a statute such as California Civil Code Section 200 be-
cause there it does not appear that the state must engage in affirmative
action in order to deprive the father of custody of his children.
2. Equal Protection
Under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
state legislation may not arbitrarily and discriminatorily classify citi-
zens. However, "[tihe Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact. . . to be treated in law as though they were the same." 91
A legislative distinction must have "some relevance to the purpose
for which the classification is made." 92 Whoever challenges the classi-
fication "must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon
any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." 9
When legislation involves mere social or economic regulation or a
personal interest which is less than fundamental, the equal protection
test applied by the Supreme Court is whether the challenged statute
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose or whether
the classification is wholly arbitrary. 4 However, when legislation af-
fects a "fundamental interest," such as voting, 5 or is based upon a
"suspect classification," such as race, 6 the classification win be upheld
only if it is justified by a compelling state interes 7 and is necessary to
accomplishment of a permissible state policy. 98
In striking down the Illinois statute in Stanley, the Supreme
Court appeared to rely primarily on procedural due process rather than
89. Id. at 654.
90. Id. at 658.
91. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
92. Baxstron v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
93. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
94. Id.
95. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
96. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-94 (1964).
97. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
98. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
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equal protection grounds. Thus the Court did not say that unwed
fathers must in all cases be given equal custody rights with unwed
mothers-but merely that such fathers could not arbitrarily be denied
a hearing on their parental fitness before the state removed children
from their custody. The Court did not say that Stanley had a funda-
mental interest in retaining custody of his children; nor did it seem to
apply the strict "compelling state interest" test to strike down the state
statute.
Illinois argued in Stanley that the illegitimate child normally knows
only one parent, the mother, and that the father is usually not present
in the home on a day-to-day basis.99 Physiological studies show that
men are not naturally inclined to childrearing, said the State, and so
the statute fulfilled a legitimate governmental purpose of protecting
children. 100 Since unwed fathers were generally not interested in their
illegitimate children and in most instances were strangers to them,10 1
the State argued that it need not undergo the inconvenience of inquir-
ing into each case.
But the Court refused to allow Illinois to presume Stanley's unfitness
merely because it was more convenient to presume than to prove. Ad-
ministrative convenience was not a sufficient basis to justify refusing a
hearing on the substantial issue at stake.'02 Furthermore, the Court
did not find justified the assumption "that an illegitimate child reared
by his natural father is less likely to receive a proper upbringing than
one reared by his natural father who was at one time married to his
mother."'01 3  While the Court agreed that protecting children is a
legitimate state goal, the goal is not furthered by separation of children
from their fit parents-in fact the goal is obstructed. 04 Thus the
Court seemed to apply the less stringent "rational relation" test in in-
validating the Illinois statute.
B. Can California Custody Statutes Withstand the "Rational Relation"
or the "Compelling State Interest" Test?
Stanley does not directly answer the question of whether statutes
such as California Civil Code Sections 200 and 224 which automati-
cally grant custody and full control of illegitimate children to the mo-
ther deny equal protection to the father. Nor is it clear which test the
Supreme Court would apply if these statutes were challenged on equal
99. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653-54 n.5 (1972).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 654 n.6.
102. Id. at 658.
103. Id. at 654 n.7.
104. Id. at 652-53.
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protection grounds-the "rational relation" or the "compelling state
interest" test. The Court has not as yet found sex to be a "suspect
classification."'10 5 Discrimination between the sexes with respect to
matters in which sex is a material factor may be made without violating
equal protection, if the classification is a natural and reasonable one. 00
Furthermore, the Court has not declared that unwed fathers have a
fundamental interest in custody of their children. Though Stanley was
found to have a substantial interest in retaining custody of the children
he had sired and raised, the Court might not have found such an in-
terest in a father who was seeking to obtain custody of children with
whom he had not had a continuing, personal relationship. Even if all
unwed fathers were found to have such a substantial interest, the Court
would apply only the rational relation test to statutes which denied a
less than fundamental interest.
1. Applying the "Rational Relation" Test
It is arguable that laws which distinguish married parents from un-
married parents have a rational relation to the reasonable state pur-
poses of discouraging promiscuity, encouraging legitimation of chil-
dren, and protecting the welfare of children. Custody rights of par-
ents, the argument might continue, derive from the legal relationship
between married parents and their children, and the state is justified in
concluding that, on the whole, unmarried persons make poorer parents
than married persons. However, Stanley indicates that not all unwed
parents may be presumed unfit. Furthermore, examination of the Cal-
ifornia statutes shows that they do not distinguish between married and
unmarried parents as such. Under Civil Code Sections 200 and 224,
the unwed mother's custody rights are actually greater than the statutory
rights of married parents.' 0 7  That is, an unwed mother not only
has exclusive custody rights but may even permit her child to be
adopted without the father's consent. Therefore, in view of the prefer-
ential treatment given to unwed mothers as opposed to either legitimate
parents or illegitimate fathers, the statutes cannot rationally be said to
discourage promiscuity or to protect children from the status of ille-
gitimacy.
Secondly, custody rights of married parents are not distinguished on
105. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), the Court upheld a Michigan
statute that prohibited women from tending bar unless they were the wife or daughter
of the bar's male owner. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court struck
down an Idaho statute that favored men over women as estate administrators; but the
Court did not say in Reed that sex was a suspect classification-rather, it applied
the rational relation test.
106. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948).
107. CAL. Crv. CODE §§197, 200, 224, 4600; CAL. PROB. CODE §§1407, 1408.
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the basis of sex under California statutes.'08 The mother is no longer
to be preferred as custodian of very young children. 109 Parents are
given preference as against all other parties, and neither parent is to be
preferred as against the other. 110 Therefore, legislative discrimination
against unwed fathers would have to be justified on some basis other
than the mere fact of their sex. That is, it cannot be argued that un-
wed fathers have unequal custody rights with unwed mothers because
men are inherently less suited to child care, since this attitude is not
reflected in the statutes governing custody of legitimate children.
If in fact there is a valid reason to suppose an illegitimate child will
not enjoy the same paternal love and affection as a legitimate one, thus
justifying the need for statutory protection, is there any reason to as-
sume less paternal than maternal love and affection? In his dissent to
Stanley, Chief Justice Burger argued that a state may reasonably con-
clude "that the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing
an infant creates stronger bonds between her and the child than the
bonds resulting from the male's often casual encounter."' Can we
assume this biological role always makes the mother the more fit parent,
any more than we could assume this role creates stronger bonds in a
legitimate child's mother than exist in its father? At least if an unwed
father does have a substantial interest in obtaining custody, equal pro-
tection would seem to demand a case-by-case consideration of which
parent's custody would serve the child's best interests, rather than pre-
suming all mothers to be better parents than are fathers. If a father
has no parental concern for his illegitimate child, it seems very un-
likely that he would seek custody anyway.
It appears, therefore, that the California statutory preference for
mothers of illegitimate children may be an arbitrary legislative choice
denying unwed fathers equal protection of the law.
2. Applying the "Compelling State Interest" Test
Although the United States Supreme Court has not found sex to be
a "suspect classification," the California Supreme Court in Sail'er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby concluded that sex, being "a status to which class mem-
bers are locked into by the accident of birth,"1 1 2 is properly treated as
a suspect classification. Thus California custody statutes that classify
on the basis of sex presumably would be examined under the strict
"compelling state interest" test as applied by the California court.
108. CAL. CIV. CODE §197.
109. CAL. CIV. CODE §4600, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1007.
110. CAL. CIV. CODE §§197, 4600; CAL. PROB. CODE §§1407, 1408.
111. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972).
112. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 485 P.2d 529, 540, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329, 340 (1971).
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Regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct has been held a
compelling state interest. 11 However, as indicated previously, since
the State does not deny parental rights to the mother of an illegitimate
child, the assertion that the State policy discourages promiscuity is not
very convincing.
The State might claim that it can require a father to legitimate his
child under Civil Code Section 230 before granting him custody, on
the grounds that legitimation of children is a compelling State interest.
As Justice Traynor argued in Guardianship of Smith, a father who
can legitimate his child but chooses not to thereby demonstrates his
unfitness as a parent. 1 4
Yet with all classes of parents other than unwed fathers, their fitness
as parents is presumed under the parental preference rule. Can the
illegitimate child's father be uniquely burdened with the presumption
of unfitness? We do not require the mother of an illegitimate child to
legitimate the child, or explain her past failure to marry the father, be-
fore granting custody to her.
Further, the State cannot rationally argue that legitimation of the
child is the State's overriding concern in custody disputes involving
illegitimate children. Surely the child's best interests are most impor-
tant. If legitimation were all-important, then theoretically the State
could remove all illegitimate children from the custody of their mo-
thers or fathers and place them in institutions until the children could
be formally adopted by strangers and thus acquire legitimate status.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that laws which
discriminate against illegitimate children may violate the equal protec-
tion clause where the right asserted by such children has no relation to
the wrong committed by their parents. In Levy v. Louisiana"8 the
Court invalidated a statute which denied illegitimate children the right
to recover damages for the wrongful death of their mother. The Me-
gitimate children were just as dependent on their mother as are legiti-
mate children,1 6 the Court said and concluded that it was invidious
discrimination to prevent their claim of damages for her loss."17
Similarly, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co."8 the Court
113. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965).
114. Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 98, 265 P.2d 888, 892-93 (1954).
115. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
116. Id. at 72.
117. Id.
118. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Distinguish Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971),
wherein the Court upheld a statute that barred illegitimate children from sharing
equally with legitimates in the estate of their father who had died intestate. The
Court argued that if the father had intended to leave property to his illegitimate
daughter he could easily have executed a will naming her as a beneficiary. 401 U.S.
at 539.
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struck down a statute which prohibited dependent, unacknowledged
illegitimate children from recovering under state workmen's compensa-
tion laws for their father's death on an equal basis with the father's
dependent legitimate children. Society may condemn illegitimate rela-
tionships, said the Court, "[b]ut visiting this condemnation on the head
of an infant is illogical and unjust. '" 119
Perhaps custody statutes which deny parental status to unwed fa-
thers are just as discriminatory against illegitimate children as they are
against the fathers. If a natural father is not allowed to show that he
is a more suitable guardian for his child than is the mother (or an in-
stitution or a stranger, when the mother has died, is unfit, or puts the
child up for adoption), then the child loses his right to the care and
companionship of a natural and arguably fit parent. It would seem
more protective of the child's best interests to presume, as we do with
legitimate children, that his needs are best served by custody in a na-
tural parent-of either sex-who wishes to care for the child.
C. Equal Rights Amendment
An equal rights amendment was passed by Congress 20 during the
1971-72 session and was ratified by the California Legislature 2' in
November 1972. If the amendment is ratified by the required three-
fourths of the states, the Constitution will provide: "Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex. '"122
What effect would the amendment have on custody laws favoring
mothers over fathers? The amendment was apparently intended to
grant complete equality between the sexes. A House supporter of the
amendment stated that it would eliminate any legal presumption favor-
ing the granting of custody to the mother.12 3 A Senate report stated as
the basic principle of the amendment that sex should not be a factor
in determining the legal rights of men or of women.2 4  However,
the amendment would not prohibit classifications based on characteris-
tics that are unique to one sex.
Since the qualifications of a fit parent are not unique to either sex,
laws denying unwed fathers equal custody rights with unwed mothers
119. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
120. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REc. H.9392 (1971);
S.Y Res. 8-9, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG. REc. S.4612 (1972).
121. SJ.R. 20, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 148.
122. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REc. H.9392 (1971);
S.J. Res. 8-9, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CoNG. REc. S.4612 (1972).
123. 117 CONG. REc. 9247 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1971) (remarks of Representative
Edwards).
124. 118 CONG. REc. 4389 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh);
S. Rep. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
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would probably be unconstitutional under the amendment. Just as
women could not be presumed unsuitable for the draft, unmarried par-
ents could not be presumed unfit merely because they were men.
CONCLUSION
Unwed fathers are presently recognized as having natural rights to
custody of their children only upon the mother's death. On the other
hand, both parents of legitimate children have preferred status as custo-
dians as against third parties, and neither parent is preferred against the
other. While the best interests of the child are the important factor,
custody in married parents-and in an unmarried mother-is pre-
sumed to serve those interests; yet custody in unmarried fathers is pre-
sumed not to serve those interests.
It appears evident that the parental preference rule is more desirable
than a strict best interest rule which is too vague a standard to be ap-
plied equitably-parental preference protects not just parents' rights but
the parent-child relationship from state interference.
By analogy to the equal protection argument in Stanley, unwed fa-
thers should not be presumed unfit when all other classes of parents,
including unwed mothers, are presumed fit. A father should have the
chance to prove he is the more suitable parent to have custody.
Though an unwed father may be difficult to locate, inconvenience in
locating and identifying him should not be sufficient grounds to pre-
sume him unfit. If he does not respond to reasonable notice, statutes
may be applied to compel his forfeiture of custody rights. If he aban-
dons his child or willfully fails to maintain it, he likewise forfeits cus-
tody rights.
Stanley indicates that at the very least an unwed father has a sub-
stantial interest in retaining custody of his illegitimate children. Since
no convincing evidence exists that unwed mothers are always better
parents than unwed fathers, no individual unwed father should be de-
nied the opportunity to prove himself a fit parent.
Statutes giving unwed mothers the right to exclusive custody and
control of their children should, in the writer's opinion, be repealed
since they appear to be constitution ally invalid. The rule of Califor-
nia Civil Code Section 4600, under which custody is awarded to a
parent unless such award would be detrimental to the child, should be
applied to all natural parents, married or unmarried. Contrary to the
present policy of merely burdening the unwed father with the obliga-
tion to support his child, a policy of equal custody rights might ac-
tually encourage his parental responsibility.
Julie Demaris Belvel
